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Abstract
This paper considers a world of two symmetric countries with two factors and two
sectors. Outputs of the two sectors are imperfect substitutes and the sectors di®er
in relative factor intensity. Each sector contains a continuum of heterogeneous ¯rms
that produce di®erentiated goods within their sector. Trade is costly and there are
both variable and ¯xed costs of exporting. The paper shows that under some plausible
conditions supported by the data, trade between similar countries can increase the
demand for skilled labor, which in turn increases the wage inequality between skilled
and unskilled labor. The quantitative analysis suggests that such trade e®ects have
played an important role in the increase in the US skill premium.
JEL Classi¯cation: F12, F13, and L1
Keywords: Firm Heterogeneity, Trade, and Skill Premium
¤Department of Economics; Louisiana State University; Baton Rouge, LA 70803, USA. Tel: (225)578-
3792 and Fax: (225)578-3708. E-mail: bunel@lsu.edu.1 Introduction
A large literature documents dramatic changes in the US labor market over the post-war
period: despite a rapid increase in the relative supply of skills, the skill premium has not
declined.1 Indeed, the skill premium has generally risen, and it has risen more signi¯cantly
since the late 1970s. During the same period, trade with less developed countries (LDC)
has also increased substantially. These patterns lead some economists to argue that the
skill premium has increased because trade with LDCs raised the demand for skilled labor in
the developed countries.2 However, this explanation is discounted by most economists. For
example, Krugman (1995) argues that although trade with LDCs has increased, volumes
of trade with LDCs are still too small to explain the large increases in the skill premium
that have taken place. Furthermore, several empirical studies (e.g., Behrman et al., 2000)
¯nd that many of the LDCs have also experienced rising inequality after opening to trade,
which contradicts the conventional trade story.
This paper studies the e®ects of trade on the skill premium by focusing on the trade
between symmetric countries (North-North trade). It develops a theoretical model, which is
a blend of the models presented by Acemoglu (2002b) and Melitz (2003), to show that trade,
even between similar countries, can increase the skill premium. The model has two sectors
(skill intensive and less skill intensive) and two factors of production (skilled and unskilled
labor). Outputs of the two sectors are imperfect substitutes as in Acemoglu (2002b), and
each sector is populated by a continuum of ¯rms each producing a di®erent product. As in
Melitz (2003), ¯rms in each sector are heterogeneous in their productivity levels and higher
productivity is modeled as producing a variety at lower marginal cost. Firms wishing to
export face both ¯xed foreign-market entry costs and per unit trade costs.
There are three main ¯ndings. First, only the most productive ¯rms engage in export
1See, for example, Katz and Murphy (1992) and Krusell et al. (2000). Aceomglu (2002a) provides a
comprehensive review of this literature.
2See Wood (1994) and (1998). Another explanation is that new technologies have been skill biased and
there has been an acceleration in skill-biased technical change (see, e.g., Acemoglu, 1998).activities, and exposure to trade contributes to productivity gains in each sector. These
results mirror the ¯ndings reported in Melitz (2003). Second, the positive e®ect of trade on
the skill premium depends on both the dispersion of ¯rm productivity levels and the degree
of openness in each sector. In particular, it shows that when the productivity distribution
of ¯rms in the skill intensive sector (stochastically) dominate those in the labor intensive
sector, and the ¯rms in the skill intensive sector are more exposed to trade than those in
the labor intensive sector, then such exposure to trade increases the skill premium. Finally,
the quantitative analysis suggests that increases in trade can explain about 16 percent of
the increase in the US skill premium over the last 40 years.
The intuition behind these results is as follows. Since entry into foreign markets is costly,
exposure to trade provides new pro¯t opportunities only to the more productive ¯rms in
each sector. Such pro¯t opportunities also induce entry of more new ¯rms in each sector,
which further increases demand for both skilled and unskilled labor. The increased demand
for inputs by the more productive ¯rms and the new entrants increases real wages, which
in turn forces the least productive ¯rms to exit the market. However, since ¯rms in the
skill intensive sector are relatively more productive, use skilled labor more intensively, and
are relatively more open, the potential returns from export markets are higher. As a result,
the demand for skilled labor is higher than that for unskilled labor, which in turn raises the
skill premium.
This paper is related to an emerging literature that proposes alternative mechanisms
through which trade, even between similar countries, has a positive impact on the skill
premium. For example, Dinopolous et al. (2001) present a monopolistic competition model
that highlights the role of quasi-homothetic preferences, non-homothetic production, and
output-skill complementarities on the skill premium. Moving from autarky to free inter-
industry trade causes an expansion of ¯rm size, and hence, an increase in the skill premium.
Neary (2002), on the other hand, proposes an oligopolistic model in which a reduction in im-
port barriers induces incumbent ¯rms to invest more strategically. This strategic investment
2increases the demand for skilled labor, and hence, the skill premium. In an interesting ar-
ticle, Matsuyama (2007), using a Ricardian model of trade, argues that international trade
inherently requires a more intensive use of skilled labor; as a result, exposure to trade
increases the demand for skilled labor, and hence, the skill premium.
In this literature, this paper is more closely related to Epifani and Gancia (2008) who
also consider a similarly structured two-sector model. They show that if the elasticity of
substitution between output of two sectors is greater than one and the skill intensive sector
has stronger returns to scale, then an exposure to trade will be skill-biased. Furthermore,
their quantitative analysis suggests that the e®ects of trade on wage inequality can be
substantial. The main di®erences between this paper and Epifani and Gancia (2008) are that
my model incorporates ¯rm heterogeneity and ¯xed costs of exporting.3 These di®erences
have important consequences. For example, the condition that the skill intensive sector
has stronger returns to scale is neither necessary nor su±cient for trade to have a positive
e®ect on the skill premium. As emphasized above, su±ciency conditions depend on both the
dispersion of ¯rm productivity levels and the degree of openness in each sector. Furthermore,
my quantitative analysis delivers a lower impact of trade on the skill premium than Epifani
and Ganica's analysis.
The plan of this paper is as follows. Section 2 introduces the model and identify con-
ditions for trade to have a positive e®ect on the skill premium. Section 3 investigates the
quantitative implications of the model. Finally, section 4 concludes the paper.
2 The Model
Consider a global economy consisting of M +1 structurally identical countries. Each econ-
omy has two sectors, each containing a large number of heterogeneous ¯rms. Labor is the
only factor of production and each country is endowed with Ls units of skilled labor and
3There is now a large empirical literature that documents substantial variation in productivity across
¯rms, even narrowly de¯ned industries, and substantial sunk costs of entry into foreign markets. See, for
example, Tybout (2003) for a review of this literature.
3Lu units of unskilled labor. The skilled and unskilled labor are inelastically supplied and
they remain constant over time.
2.1 Consumer Preferences
Consumer preferences are identical across all countries and modeled by the following CES
utility function
U =
·
Y
"¡1
"
s + Y
"¡1
"
u
¸ "
"¡1
; (1)
where Ys and Yu represent the consumption of ¯nal goods s and u; and " is the elasticity
of substitution between the two goods. As in Acemoglu (2002b), it is assumed that " > 1:
Maximizing (1) subject to the budget constraint yields the following relative demand
for two goods
Ys
Yu
=
µ
Ps
Pu
¶¡"
: (2)
where Ps and Pu denote the prices of good s and u; respectively.
2.2 Production
The ¯nal goods are produced by perfectly competitive ¯rms according to the following
production technology,
Yi =
·Z
j2Ji
yi(j)½idj
¸ 1
½i
; (3)
where Ji represents the mass of available intermediate goods in sector i and yi(j) is the
amount of intermediate good type j used in the production of good i: I assume that 0 <
½i < 1 so that the elasticity of substitution between any two goods, ¾i; is greater than one,
i.e., ¾i = 1=(1 ¡ ½i) > 1: It is further assumed that ¾s;¾u > ":
Given Pi and Yi; it is easy to show that the optimal quantity and expenditure levels for
each intermediate good are given by
yi(j) = Yi
·
pi(j)
Pi
¸¡¾i
and ri(j) = Ri
·
pi(j)
Pi
¸1¡¾i
; (4)
4where pi(j) is the price of that brand j and Ri = PiYi =
R
ri(i)di denotes the aggregate
expenditure on di®erentiated intermediate goods in sector i: Moreover, competition in the
supply of goods qi(j) ensures the equilibrium price Pi equals the unit manufacturing cost:
Pi =
·Z
j2Ji
pi(j)1¡¾idj
¸ 1
1¡¾i
: (5)
Intermediate goods are produced by a continuum of monopolists, each choosing to pro-
duce a di®erent variety. The skilled and unskilled labor are the only factors of production,
and ¯rms in the skill (less-skill) intensive sector use only skilled (unskilled) labor.4 Pro-
duction has both ¯xed and variable costs in each period: to produce yi units of output in
sector i; fi +yi=' units of type i labor must be used, where fi > 0 is a ¯xed overhead cost.
Thus, as in Melitz (2003), all ¯rms in sector i share the same ¯xed cost, but have di®erent
productivity levels (which remain constant during their lifetime).
Firms wishing to export, however, face both per-unit trade costs and ¯xed costs. Per-
unit costs (such as transport and tari®s) are modeled in the standard iceberg formulation:
in sector i; ¿i > 1 units of a good must be shipped in order for one unit to arrive at its
destination. In addition, exporting involves a ¯xed foreign-market-entry cost of wiFix > 0;
where wi is the wage rate of type i labor. The foreign market entry cost covers the cost
of modifying the product to meet the foreign market speci¯cations and costs based on
regulations imposed by governments to erect non-tari® barriers to trade. The investment
decision abroad occurs after the ¯rm's productivity is revealed.
Each incumbent ¯rm faces a constant probability of death ± in each period. Since there
is also no uncertainty in the export market, each ¯rm is indi®erent between paying one
time investment cost wiFix and paying wifix (with fix = ±Fix) in each period. Hereafter I
assume that in each period exporters pay wifix in addition to the overhead production cost
wifi:
4Ventura (1997) and Acemoglu (2002b) also make the same assumption about factor intensity (see also
Epifani and Gancia, 2008). Theoretical results will remain qualitatively similar, even if both factors are
used in production, as long as the skill intensive sector uses skilled labor more intensively than the labor
intensive sector. However, the analysis becomes quite complicated (see Appendix).
5Consider the optimal pricing decision of a ¯rm with productivity ': Each ¯rm faces a
demand curve described in (4), and pro¯t maximizing behavior yields the following price
rules in domestic and foreign markets:
pd(') =
w
½'
; px(') =
w¿
½'
; (6)
where I omit the sector subscript to simplify the notation, and will do so when this causes
no confusion.
Given this pricing rule, the per-period pro¯ts of exporting ¯rms can be decomposed into
two parts: pro¯ts earned from domestic sales ¼d('); and pro¯ts earned from sales in each
of M export markets ¼x('):
¼d(') = rd(') ¡ wy=' ¡ wf = rd(')=¾ ¡ wf; (7)
¼x(') = rx(') ¡ w¿y=' ¡ wfx = rx(')=¾ ¡ wfx; (8)
where rd and rx denote the revenues obtained from sales in domestic and each of export
markets.
Using the pricing rules given by (6) in (4) implies that
yd('1)
yd('2)
=
yx('1)
yx('2)
=
µ
'1
'2
¶¾
;
rd('1)
rd('2)
=
rx('1)
rx('2)
=
µ
'1
'2
¶¾¡1
;
rx(')
rd(')
= ¿1¡¾: (9)
As shall be shown below, only a fraction of ¯rms export. Thus, a ¯rm with productivity
' earns a per-period pro¯t ¼(') = ¼d(')+maxf0;M¼x(')g: Since each ¯rm faces a constant
probability of death ± in each period, the market value of a typical ¯rm is given by
º(') = max
(
0;
1 X
t=0
(1 ¡ ±)t¼(')
)
= max
½
0;
1
±
¼(')
¾
: (10)
A ¯rm with productivity ' produces only if ¼d(') ¸ 0: Since ¼d(') is an increasing and
continuous function of '; there is a su±ciently small ' where ¼d(') < 0: Then there exists
a productivity cuto® level 'd such that ¼d('d) = 0: Similarly, the ¯rm serves in foreign
6markets only if ¼x(') ¸ 0: The pro¯t function ¼x(') is also an increasing function of ';
hence, by the same logic, there exits a productivity cuto® level 'x such that ¼x('x) = 0:
Notice that at 'x; ¼d('x) > 0 , rd('x) > ¾wf: From the export cuto® condition
rx('x) = ¾wfx: But then ¿1¡¾rd('x) = ¾wfx, which in turn implies that ¿¾¡1fx > f:
To ensure partitioning of ¯rms, I assume that this condition holds. Furthermore, the zero
cuto® pro¯t conditions for domestic and export markets yields
rx('x)
rd('d)
= ¿1¡¾
µ
'x
'd
¶¾¡1
=
fx
f
() 'x = 'd¿
µ
fx
f
¶ 1
¾¡1
: (11)
2.3 Entry Decision and Equilibrium Analysis
The determination of the production cuto® quality level depends on ¯rms' entry decisions.
There is a large number of prospective and ex-ante identical entrants. Firms face an initial
investment of fe > 0 units of labor, which is thereafter sunk. Firms then draw their
productivity parameter ' from a common distribution g(¢) with positive support over (0;1)
and with continuous cumulative distribution G(¢):5
Notice that the ex-ante probability of successful entry is 1 ¡ G('): Thus, the ex-post
distribution of ¯rm productivity, ¹('); is the conditional distribution of g(') on ['d;1) :
¹(') =
(
g(')
1¡G('d) if ' > 'd
0 otherwise
(12)
The ex-ante probability that one of these successful ¯rms will export is given by ³x =
[1 ¡ G('x)]=[1 ¡ G('d)]: In addition, the law of large numbers implies that ³x equals the
ex-post fraction of incumbent ¯rms that export. Let Ni denote the mass of ¯rms operating
in sector i in any country. The mass of exporting ¯rms then is given by Nix = ³ixNi: With
the above distribution function, the aggregate price index de¯ned (5) becomes
Pi =
wi
½i
h
Ni ~ '
¾i¡1
id + MNix(¿¡1 ~ 'ix)¾i¡1
i 1
1¡¾i ; (13)
5Both the ¯xed costs and the distribution functions are sector speci¯c. More precisely, ¯rms in sector
i invest fie units of type i labor, and then draw their productivity parameter from a common distribution
gi(¢):
7where M is the number of trading partners, and 'z (z = d;x) is given by
~ 'z ´ ~ 'z('z) =
·
1
1 ¡ G('z)
Z 1
'z
'¾¡1g(')d'
¸ 1
¾¡1
: (14)
Thus, ~ 'd is the weighted harmonic mean of the productivity levels of all operating ¯rms
and can be interpreted as the average (expected) productivity level. Similarly, ~ 'x is the
weighted harmonic mean of the productivity levels of exporters and can be interpreted as
the average productivity level of exporting ¯rms.
With this average productivity, it is easy to show that the average pro¯t in sector i is
given by
¹ ¼i = ¼id(~ 'id) + ³ixM¼ix(~ 'ix): (15)
Using (9) in the zero cuto® pro¯t conditions, on the other hand, implies
¼id(~ 'id) = wifi
"µ
~ 'id
'id
¶¾i¡1
¡ 1
#
; ¼ix(~ 'ix) = wifix
"µ
~ 'ix
'ix
¶¾i¡1
¡ 1
#
:
Substituting these into the average pro¯t function given by (15) yields
¹ ¼i = wifi
"µ
~ 'id
'id
¶¾i¡1
¡ 1
#
+ ³ixMwifix
"µ
~ 'ix
'ix
¶¾i¡1
¡ 1
#
: (16)
Since the ex-ante probability of successful entry is 1¡Gi('id); in any equilibrium where
entry is unrestricted, the net value of entry must be zero:
[1 ¡ Gi('id)]
¹ ¼i
±
= wfie: (17)
Substituting (16) into the free entry condition (17) yields
fiHi('id) + MfixHi('ix) = ±fie; (18)
where H is de¯ned as
H('z) ´ [1 ¡ G('z)]
"µ
~ 'z
'z
¶¾¡1
¡ 1
#
; z = d;x:
8As originally shown by Melitz (2003), H('z) decreases in 'z: Moreover, according to (11)
'ix is an increasing function of 'id: Thus, equations (11) and (19) yield a unique solution
for ('id;'ix):
Before going further, it is interesting to compare the domestic cuto® level with that in
autarky. The closed-economy steady-state equilibrium condition is obtained by setting the
number of trading partners to zero (i.e., M = 0) in (18). Hence, the autarkic production
cuto® level 'a
id is determined by fiH('a
id) = ±fie; which is strictly less than the open-
economy cuto® quality level 'id: As discussed in the introduction, exposure to trade provides
new pro¯t opportunities to the more productive ¯rms, and hence, it induces more ¯rms to
enter the market. Increased demand for labor by the more productive ¯rms and the new
entrants bids up the real wages and forces the least productive ¯rms to exit, as in Melitz
(2003).
What will be the equilibrium number of products in each sector? Following Melitz
(2003), I shall only consider stationary equilibrium. The mass of successful entrants must
be equal to the mass of incumbents who are hit with the bad shock and exit, i.e., [1 ¡
Gi('id)]Nie = ±Ni; where Nie is the mass of new entrants. The total labor used by the new
entrants is Lie = Niefie = ±Nifie=[1 ¡ Gi('id)]. Combining with the free-entry condition
yields
Lie = Ni¹ ¼i=wi ) ¦i = wiLie ) Ri = ¦i + wiLip = wiLi;
where Lip denotes total amount of labor used in production in sector i: Thus, aggregate
revenue must be equal to the total payments to labor used in sector i: Since Ri = Ni¹ ri; the
equilibrium mass of incumbent ¯rms is6
Ni =
wiLi
¾i(¹ ¼i + wifi + ³ixMwifix)
: (19)
To derive the skill premium, ¯rst consider equation (2). Multiplying both sides by Ps=Pu
6To see this note that ¹ r = rd(~ 'd) + ³xMrx(~ 'x) = ¾f[~ '
¾¡1
d + ³xM(¿
¡1 ~ 'x)
¾¡1]='
¾¡1
d ; where the
last equality follows from equation (9): rd(~ 'd) = (~ 'd='d)
¾¡1rd('d) = ¾f(~ 'd='d)
¾¡1; and rx(~ 'x) =
(¿
¡1 ~ 'x='d)
¾¡1rd('d) = ¾f(¿
¡1 ~ 'x='d)
¾¡1:
9and using Rs=Ru = wsLs=wuLu; we have
µ
Ps
Pu
¶1¡"
=
wsLs
wuLu
: (20)
Using equations (13), (17), and (19) in (20) yields
! = °
µ
'sd
'ud
¶"¡1
"
L
("¡1)(¾u¡¾s)
"(¾s¡1)(¾u¡1)
"
µ
"¡¾s
"(¾s¡1)
(1 ¡ µ)
"¡¾u
"(¾u¡1)
#
; (21)
where ! = ws=wu represents the skill premium, L = Ls + Lu is the total labor supply (or
size of each country), µ = Ls=L; and ° is a constant.7 With " > 1; it follows that the skill
premium is positively related to the relative cuto® levels. If ¾u > ¾s; then the skill premium
increases with increases in the size of the economy (i.e., total labor supply L) and decreases
in the relative supply of skills. The net e®ect depends on the strength of these opposite
forces.
It easily follows from (21) that
! =
µ
'sd='a
sd
'ud='a
ud
¶ "¡1
"
!a; (22)
where superscript a stands for autarky. This equation indicates that if exposure to trade
increases the domestic cuto® productivity level in the skill intensive sector more than that
in the less skill intensive sector, then the skill premium will increase.
I now turn to the parametrization of the distribution function by assuming that pro-
ductivity draws follow a Pareto distribution:
Gi(') = 1 ¡
µ
bi
'
¶ki
; i = s;u; (23)
where ki is the shape parameter and bi is the scale parameter that bounds the support
[bi;+1) from below. I further assume that ki + 1 > ¾i; which ensures that the integrals in
aggregate variables converge.
7° =
·
½s(¾ufu)
1
¾u¡1
½u(¾sfs)
1
¾s¡1
¸ "¡1
"
:
10Pareto distribution has been widely used in recent trade literature and it makes the anal-
ysis analytically more tractable. Furthermore, many studies (e.g., Helpman et al. (2004))
¯nd that the distribution of ¯rm sizes in the US closely follow a Pareto distribution.
Using this speci¯c distribution form in (11) and (17) yields
'id = (1 + ­i)
1
ki 'a
id with ­i = M¿
¡ki
i T
1¡
ki
¾i¡1
i ; Ti =
fix
fi
: (24)
Note that ­i increases with increases in the number of trading partners (M) and decreases
in trade costs (¿i and Ti). Thus, ­i measures the degree of openness: a higher value of
­i corresponds to a more open economy. Furthermore, an inspection of (24) reveals that
further exposure to trade increases the productivity cuto® level 'id:8
Equation (22) then becomes
! =
"
(1 + ­s)
1
ks
(1 + ­u)
1
ku
# "¡1
"
!a: (25)
With no ¯rm heterogeneity and foreign market ¯xed entry costs, the skill premium in
the open economy is given by
! =
"
(1 + M¿1¡¾s
s )
1
¾s¡1
(1 + M¿1¡¾u
u )
1
¾u¡1
#"¡1
"
!a: (26)
Notice that equation (26) is the same as (25) with ki = ¾i ¡ 1:
To make a comparison between the two cases easier, assume that ¿s = ¿u = ¿; Ts =
Tu = T; and " > 1: Clearly, with ¾s < ¾u; exposure and further exposure to trade raises
the skill premium in (26): Epifani and Gancia's (2008) main conclusion. An inspection
of (25), on the other hand, indicates that the condition ¾s < ¾u is neither necessary nor
su±cient for trade to have positive e®ect on the skill premium: for example, under ks = ku;
exposure to trade reduces the skill premium, if T > 1; and it increases the skill premium, if
T < 1: Thus, moving from autarky to trade has an ambiguous e®ect on the skill premium.
8By using conditions described by (11) and (18), it is easy to show that this conclusion holds under any
distribution function.
11Similarly, the e®ect of a further exposure to trade is also ambiguous. Clearly, the shape
parameter (ki), which governs the size of dispersion of productivity, and the ratio of ¯xed
costs (T) all play key roles in determining the e®ects of trade on the skill premium.9
When does trade have positive e®ects on the skill premium? The following proposition
summarizes su±ciency conditions that make exposure and further exposure to trade have
positive e®ects on the skill premium.
Proposition. Suppose that the elasticity of substitution between output of two sectors is
greater than one (i.e., " > 1) and productivity draws follow the Pareto distribution described
in (23).
i. If ks 6 ku and ­s > ­u (assuming that one of these holds with strict inequality),
then the skill premium in the open economy is greater than that in the autarky, i.e.
exposure to trade rises the skill premium.
ii. Let ks 6 ku and ­s > ­u (assuming that one of these holds with strict inequality).
Suppose that after opening to trade, the economy is further exposed to trade and let
­0
i represent the new equilibrium value of ­i: If ­0
s=­s > ­0
u=­u; then such further
exposure to trade rises the skill premium.
Before discussing quantitative implications of the model, it is important to evaluate what
ks 6 ku means. The shape parameter ki represents dispersion levels of ¯rm productivity:
a sector with lower k has higher productivity dispersion levels. Indeed, the productivity
levels in the skill intensive sector ¯rst-order stochastically dominates that in the less skill
intensive sector if and only if bs > bu and ks 6 ku:10 Thus, ks 6 ku; in addition to bs > bu;
9It should be emphasized that the condition ¾u > ¾s is still necessary for the market size e®ect to be
positive, i.e., d!=dL > 0:
10To see this, ¯rst recall that Gs ¯rst-order stochastically dominates Gu(¢) if and only if 1 ¡ Gs(') >
1 ¡ Gu(') for each ': Suppose that bu > bs: Then for ' = bu;1 ¡ Gs(bu) > 1 ¡ Gu(bu) ) (bs=bu)
ks >
1 ) bs > bu; a contradiction with our supposition. Thus, bs > bu: To show that ks 6 ku; note that
1 ¡ Gs(') > 1 ¡ Gu(') ) b
ks
s =b
ku
u > '
ks¡ku; for all ': Since bj and kj are constants, the left-hand side
12implies that productivity levels in the skill intensive sector are stochastically better than
that in the less skill intensive sector. Then the above proposition can (roughly) be stated as
follows: when the skill intensive sector is more productive (in a stochastic sense) and more
open than the less skill intensive sector, trade has a positive e®ect on the skill premium.
3 Quantitative Analysis
How likely are the conditions in the above proposition satis¯ed in practice? If they hold
in practice, what will be the impact of the trade on the skill premium? I start with the
parameter "; which also measures the elasticity of substitution between skilled and unskilled
labor.11 Using the CPS data over the period 1963-1987, Katz and Murphy (1992) ¯nd that
it is about 1.4. Using a capital-skill complementary model, Krusell et al. (2000) estimate
the elasticity as 1.67. However, recent studies using longer series and new estimation tech-
niques ¯nd much higher estimates. For example, Reshef (2007), extending the Katz-Murphy
framework to a two-sector model and applying simulated method of moments, ¯nd that the
elasticity is about 3.2.12 In my quantitative analysis, I will consider " = 1:5 and 2.
An easy way to evaluate the claim that ­s > ­u is to compare the total trade shares
of the sectors, since the ratio of export (or import) to the sectoral output is given by
­i=(1 + ­i):13 Using the OECD bilateral trade database (2007), I ¯nd that the total trade
shares of the skill intensive industries are substantially higher than that of the less skill
intensive industries in all available years.14 For example, in 2000, the average trade share of
of this inequality is constant. If ks > ku; then for su±ciently large values of '; the right-hand side will be
greater. Thus, ks 6 ku:
11To see this, note that wiLi = Ri = PiYi implies that Yi = AiLi; where Ai = ½i ~ 'iN
1=(¾i¡1)
i represents
the index of technology in sector i: The production of the homogenous goods is then given by
Y =
h
(AsLs)
"¡1
" + (AuLu)
"¡1
"
i "
"¡1 :
12Using longer series and di®erent data, Polgreen and Silos (2008) re-estimate the Krusell et al. model.
Their estimates vary between 2 and 9!
13Export (or import) to the sectoral output ratio is given by Rix=Ri = M³ixrix(~ 'ix)=[rid(~ 'id)+rix(~ 'ix)]:
Using (9) together with zero-pro¯t cuto® conditions, one can easily show the above claim.
14To be consistent with the theoretical exploration, here I only consider the trade between US and the
13the skill intensive industries in the US is more than 40 percent, while it is about 10 percent
in the less skill intensive industries.
Consider now the condition ks 6 ku: There are two ways to evaluate this condition.
First, recall that this condition holds when productivity draws in the skill intensive sector
stochastically dominate that in the less skill intensive sector. Given that the skill intensive
sectors often have more R&D investment for process innovation,15 it is reasonable to expect
that productivity levels in the skill intensive sector stochastically dominate those in the
less skill intensive sectors. Indeed, using the OECD STAN (1998b) database, I ¯nd that
the average total factor productivity (TFP) of high-skill intensive industries (such as non-
electrical machinery, electrical machinery, and transport equipments) is about 40{90 percent
higher than that of the low-skill intensive industries (such as food, textile & apparel, wood
& furniture) in G5 countries over the period 1985-2000.16
Second, using using sales data of the US and the Western European ¯rms, Helpman et al.
(2004) estimate the measure of dispersion k¡(¾¡1) at three-digit industrial level. According
to their estimates, on average, the measure of dispersion in the skill intensive sectors are
usually lower than that in the less skill intensive sectors, i.e., ks¡(¾s¡1) < ku¡(¾u¡1):17
This implies that ku ¡ ks > ¾u ¡ ¾s: Based on the previous empirical studies, Epifani and
Gancia (2008) provide substantial evidence that ¾u > ¾s: More importantly, most studies
¯nd that the scale elasticity of the less skill intensive sectors do not signi¯cantly depart
from constant returns to scale (see, e.g., Antweiler and Tre°er, 2002). It then follows that
OECD countries. In calculating trade share, I also correct the total output by subtracting the total trade
to the non-OECD countries.
15Using the OECD Business R&D database (1998a), I ¯nd that the average R&D intensity (R&D ex-
penditure divided by the value-added) of skill intensive industries (such as food, textile & apparel, wood &
furniture) are several times higher than that of low-skill intensive sectors (such as food, textile & apparel,
wood & furniture). Some of the R&D investment may be related to quality improvement. However, as
noted by Melitz (2003), higher productivity levels in this model may also be thought of as producing a
higher quality variety at equal marginal cost.
16TFP is calculated as Y=L
®K
1¡®; where K represents capital stock and ® = 1=3 is the capital share.
17See Figure 3 in Helpman et al. (2004). Table A.1 in the earlier version of their paper reports the
estimated coe±cients on 1=[k¡(¾¡1)] for 52 industries in the US, Western Europe, and France. According
to this table, the simple average of the dispersions in the skill intensive sectors is around 0.75, while it is
about 0.9 in the less skill intensive sectors, implying that ks ¼ ¾s ¡ 0:25 and ku ¼ ¾u ¡ 0:1:
14ks < ku:18
I now turn to quantitative analysis. As discussed above, for "; I shall consider two
possibilities: " = 1:5 and 2: I assume that ¾s = 3:5 (consistent with Morrison and Siegel,
1999 and Bernard et al., 2003); and following Epifani and Gancia (2008), I set ¾u = 1
(consistent with Antweiler and Tre°er, 2002). Setting ¾u = 1 provides a benchmark case
in which there will be no trade in the less skill intensive sector.19 For the shape parameter
ks; I will consider ks = 3 and 4 (ks = 3 is closer to estimates in Helpman et al. (2004)).
Table 1 represents the results for di®erent parameter values for "; ks; and ­s: The
second column represents results when there is no ¯rm heterogeneity and foreign-market
¯xed entry cost. As indicated before, ­s represents the degree of openness, and ­s=(1+­s)
represents the share of exports in the total output of sector s: For example, ­s = 0:3 means
that the share of export in total output is about 23 percent. The table shows that moving
from autarky to a partial integration with ­s = 1 (i.e., to an export share of 67 percent)
can raise the skill premium by 15 percent when there is no heterogeneity; while it increases
the skill premium by up to 12 percent under heterogeneous ¯rms. A comparison of the last
three columns in Table 1 with column 2 shows that under the ¯rm heterogeneity the impact
of trade on the skill premium is considerably lower than that under the no heterogeneity
case.
It will be interesting to investigate the implications of this exercise for the rises in the
US skill premium. In 1970, the total trade (export plus import) share in the skill intensive
industry output was about 10 percent, which implies that ­s = 0:05:20 In 2005, however,
18Helpman et al. (2004) use the Melitz model as the basis for their estimates and in that framework
they can not separately estimate k and ¾: Using ¯rm-level data, Corcos et al. (2007) directly estimate k
at two-digit industrial level, and according to their results ks ¼ ku (see Table 7 in their paper). However,
their model doesn't have elasticity of substitution (¾i) between di®erent products because of the quasi-linear
preference structure that they use. Furthermore, they don't consider ¯xed foreign market entry costs.
19Allowing for trade in the less skill intensive sector will not have any signi¯cant e®ect on the skill
premium. There are two reasons for this. First, as discussed above, according to the OECD trade database
­s is substantially higher than ­u: Second, given that ¾u is very high, the condition ku > 1 + ¾u implies
that ku is also very high. Consequently, (1 + ­u)
1=ku will be very small.
20I consider Chemical Products, Non-Electrical Machinery, Electrical Machinery, and Transport Equip-
ments as the skill intensive sectors. To be consistent with the model, I only consider the trade between
15Table 1: Increase in the Skill Premium (%)
" = 2:0 " = 1:5
­s No Heter. ks = 3 ks = 4 No Heter. ks = 3 ks = 4
0.3 5.4 4.5 3.3 3.0 2.5 1.9
0.5 8.4 7.0 5.2 5.6 4.6 3.4
1.0 14.9 12.2 9.1 9.7 8.0 5.9
2.0 24.6 20.1 14.7 15.8 13.0 9.6
Notes: No Heter. refers to no ¯rm heterogeneity and no ¯xed foreign market entry costs.
the total trade share was about 65% (and export being about 30%), which implies that
­s ¼ 0:50: For " = 2 and ks = 3; these measures imply about a 6.2 percent increase in the
skill premium, whereas they imply about about 11 percent increase in the skill premium
under " = 1:5 and ks = 4: Given that there has been about a 27 percent increase in the wage
gap between skilled and unskilled labor,21 these further imply that the trade between US
and OECD countries (according to the above model) can account for about a 16% increase
in the US skill premium: a signi¯cant contribution to the overall wage inequality.
4 Concluding Remarks
This paper studies the e®ects of intra-industry trade between similar countries on the skill
premium. It develops a two-sector model in which outputs of the two sectors are imperfect
substitutes, and each sector contains a large number of heterogeneous ¯rms specialized to
produce di®erentiated goods. I show that under some plausible conditions supported by
the data, trade between similar countries can increase the skill premium. When the model
is calibrated with the US data, I ¯nd that increases in trade can explain up to 23 percent
of rises in the skill premium.
the US and the OECD countries. In calculating trade share, I also corrected total output by subtracting
the total trade to other countries. The data are taken from the various issues of the OECD STAN and the
bilateral trade databases, which cover from 1970 to 2005.
21The skill premium is calculated using the CPS surveys that cover 1970-2005. Following Krusell et al.
(2000), everyone who has at least 16 years of schooling (i.e., at least college degree) is considered skilled,
and those who have fewer years of schooling are unskilled.
16Although ¯rms in the model are forward looking, there is no technical change, and
hence, no growth. I also extended the model to a product innovation growth model to
analyze the combined e®ects of skill-biased technical change and trade on the skill premium
as in Acemoglu (2002b). In addition, I incorporated capital goods in the production pro-
cess. However, these modi¯cations require that ¾s = ¾u; otherwise, there would not be a
balanced growth path.22 Under this extension, the trade still has a positive e®ect on the
skill premium, but the market size e®ect will disappear due to the restriction that ¾s = ¾u:
Appendix: When Each Sector Uses Both Factors
Assume that the cost function takes the following form
ci(ws;wu)
·
fi +
yi
'
¸
with ci(ws;wu) = w®i
s w1¡®i
u
where ®i is the labor share of skilled workers in sector i and we assume that ®s > ®u; i.e.
sector s is more skilled intensive than sector u: With this cost function, the optimal pricing
rule is now given by
pid(') =
ci(ws;wu)
½'
; pix(') =
¿c(ws;wu)
½'
: (27)
Firms ¯rst must make an initial investment of cifie > 0; which is thereafter sunk. Firms
then draw their initial productivity parameter ' from a common distribution gi(¢), which
is assumed to be common for ¯rms in sector i: After entry, ¯rms then face a constant
probability ± in every period of a bad shock that would force them to exit. Furthermore,
¯rms wishing to export must spend cifix in each period. All of the analysis in section 2
remains the same except wi will be replaced by ci: Following the same steps in section 2,
one can easily show that equations (11) and (18) still determine the zero pro¯t cuto® levels,
i.e., the zero pro¯t cuto® levels are identical with that in section (2).
22The detail analysis of this extension is available from the author upon request.
17For a ¯rm with productivity '; using Shephard's lemma, the total amount of skilled
labor used in the production is given by
·
fi +
yid
'
+ Â
µ
fix + ¿i
yix
'
¶¸
@ci
@ws
=
®i
ws
[½irid(') + cifi + Âf½irix(') + cifixg];
where Â = 1; if the ¯rm exports and zero otherwise. Similarly, the total amount of unskilled
labor used in production is given by (1 ¡ ®i)[½irid(') + cifi + Âf½irix(') + cifixg]=wu: It
then follows that the total amount of skilled labor used in the production process of sector
i is given by
Lisp = Ni®i[½i¹ ri + ci(fi + M³ixfix)]=ws; (28)
where ¹ ri represents the average revenue and M is the number of trading partners.
Total amount of skilled labor used in the entry process, on the other hand, is given by
Lise = fieNie
@ci
@ws
= Ni
®i
ws
±cifie
1 ¡ Gi('id)
=
Ni®i¹ ¼i
ws
; (29)
where ¹ ¼i = ¹ ri=¾i ¡ ci(fi + M³ixfix) is the average pro¯t. Combining (28) and (29) gives
total amount of skilled labor used in sector i :
Lis = ®iNi¹ ri=ws = ®iRi=ws: (30)
Using this in the labor market clearing conditions implies
wsLs = ®sRs + ®uRu; wuLu = (1 ¡ ®s)Rs + (1 ¡ ®u)Ru;
which in turn yield
Rs =
(1 ¡ ®u)wsLs ¡ ®uwuLu
®s ¡ ®u
; Ru =
®swuLu ¡ (1 ¡ ®s)wsLs
®s ¡ ®u
: (31)
However, using the zero pro¯t conditions together with (9) yields
Ri = Ni¹ ri = ¾icifi
h
Ni ~ '
¾i¡1
id + MNix(¿¡1 ~ 'ix)¾i¡1
i
='
¾i¡1
id : (32)
18The aggregate price index Pi is now given by
Pi =
ci
½i
h
Ni ~ '
¾i¡1
id + MNix(¿¡1 ~ 'ix)¾i¡1
i 1
1¡¾i :
Combining this with (32) implies
Pi =
µ
ci
½i'id
¶µ
¾icifi
Ri
¶ 1
¾i¡1
: (33)
Finally, substituting (33) into (Ps=Pu)1¡" = Rs=Ru; and then using (31) yields
'sd
'ud
= °
(
[(1 ¡ ®u)!Ls ¡ ®uLu]
¾u¡"
(¾u¡1)("¡1)
[®sLu ¡ (1 ¡ ®s)!Ls]
¾s¡"
(¾s¡1)("¡1)
)
!
( ®s¾s
¾s¡1¡ ®u¾u
¾u¡1); (34)
where ° is a constant that depends on the parameters of the model, and ! = ws=wu repre-
sents the skill premium. Given that ¾s > " and ¾u > "; it is easy to see that the expression
in the curly bracket is an increasing function of ! (assuming that " > 1). Furthermore,
when ¾u > ¾s; the last term also increases in !:23 Thus, the skill premium, !; is an increas-
ing function of the relative cuto® levels, 's='u: The su±ciency conditions described in the
proposition in section 2 still hold under this generalized case (assuming that ¾u > ¾s).
23To see this, note that
®s¾s
¾s¡1 ¡
®u¾u
¾u¡1 = ®s
h
1 +
1
¾s¡1
i
¡ ®u
h
1 +
1
¾u¡1
i
= (®s ¡ ®u) +
®s
¾s¡1 ¡
®u
¾u¡1 > 0;
where the inequality follows from our assumptions that ®s > ®u and ¾u > ¾s: Notice that ¾u > ¾s is a
weaker condition than ¾u > ¾s:
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